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Abstract
The seriousness of the incorporation problem in interdiscipli-
nary legal research, this article argues, depends on how
legal research is understood. If legal research is understood
as a single, inherently interdisciplinary discipline, the prob-
lem largely falls away. On this view, the incorporation of
other disciplines into legal research is what legal academics
have for the last 40 years already successfully been doing.
If, on the other hand, legal research is best conceived as a
multi-disciplinary field, consisting of a core discipline – doc-
trinal research – and various other types of mono-disciplina-
ry and interdisciplinary research, the incorporation of other
disciplines presents real difficulties. For legal academics
engaged in socio-legal research, in particular, two problems
arise: the practical problem of trying to address a legal pro-
fessional and academic audience at the same time and the
philosophical problem of trying to integrate the internal per-
spective of doctrinal research with the external perspective
of other disciplines. In the final part of the article, these
practical and philosophical difficulties are illustrated by refer-
ence to the author’s research on the politics of judicial
review in new democracies.
Keywords: legal research, doctrinal research, interdisciplina-
ry, incorporation problem, comparative constitutional law
1 Introduction
Can the conceptual frameworks and methods of other
disciplines be incorporated into the discipline of law?
Yes, absolutely, or no, definitely not. It all depends on
how the discipline of law is understood and, indeed, on
whether there is such a thing as ‘the discipline of law’ at
all. If law is understood as a single, inherently interdisci-
plinary discipline that has been progressively expanding
over the last 40 years to encompass a wide variety of
types of research,1 incorporation does not really present
a problem. On this view, incorporating the conceptual
frameworks and methods of other disciplines is what
* Theunis Robert Roux is Professor of Law at the University of New South
Wales, Australia.
1. See, for example, A. Bradney, ‘Law as a Parasitic Discipline’, 25 Journal
of Law & Society 71 (1998).
legal academics have already been doing: taking bits
from this discipline here, pieces from that discipline
there, and using those bits and pieces to deepen our
understanding of law’s role in society. To be sure, legal
academics have exposed themselves in this way to the
charge of interdisciplinary dilettantism – of having
become academic dabblers with no real conceptual
frameworks and methods of their own. This charge can
be met, however, by improving the rigour with which
other disciplines are used, and by emphasising legal aca-
demics’ continuing connection to the legal profession.
If, on the other hand, we understand the research that
legal academics have been doing as belonging, not to a
single discipline, but to a variety of disciplines and
interdisciplines, everything changes. For then, legal
research is best conceived as a multidisciplinary field
consisting of a core discipline – doctrinal research – and
two other main types of research: (i) interdisciplinary
research that combines doctrinal research and the con-
ceptual frameworks and methods of one or more other
disciplines and (ii) research about law and legal institu-
tions that has no doctrinal component. On this under-
standing, incorporation does present something of a
problem, at least for legal academics who are interested
in the first of these two other main types of legal
research, or what is commonly called ‘socio-legal
research’. For these academics, one of two things is at
risk of happening: either the conceptual frameworks and
methods of the other disciplines on which they are
drawing might become distorted under the pressure of
doctrinal incorporation or the reverse might occur – the
doctrinal part of their research might become subsumed
under the non-doctrinal part, to the point where their
research ceases to be of much value to the legal profes-
sion, whatever wider scholarly value it may have.
The rest of this article sets out the thinking behind this
conception of the incorporation problem. The next sec-
tion addresses the disciplinary question. While legal aca-
demics have always drawn on other disciplines, it is
argued, it is wrong to conclude from this that legal
research is an inherently interdisciplinary discipline.
Doctrinal research, for its part, is best understood as
research that is directed at the construction of legal doc-
trine in a particular legal system. Such research charac-
teristically draws on other disciplines to improve the
rational coherence and social efficacy of law. Provided
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doctrinal researchers respect the conventionally accept-
ed reasoning techniques of the legal tradition in which
they are working, there is no reason why such research
should be regarded as interdisciplinary. It follows that
legal research as a whole is best conceived as a multidis-
ciplinary field in which doctrinal research is but one of
many mono-disciplinary and interdisciplinary forms of
research being pursued.
The paper then moves on to consider the incorporation
problem when legal research is understood in this way.
The problem does not really concern doctrinal research-
ers, it is argued, because their use of other disciplines by
definition occurs on law’s terms, meaning that the
methodological standard they need to observe is an
entirely internal doctrinal standard. Rather, the problem
affects those who are engaged in the particular kind of
socio-legal research that legal academics do: research
that attempts to integrate the internal doctrinal perspec-
tive of the trained lawyer with the external perspective
of one or more other disciplines. For these researchers,
the incorporation problem is partly a practical problem
of belonging – of being forced to choose between two
audiences: the legal-professional community and the
wider academic community. It is also partly a philo-
sophical problem in as much as it raises the question,
common to all interdisciplinary research, of whether it is
possible to participate in two different practices at the
same time.
The final section of the article illustrates this under-
standing of the incorporation problem by referring to
my own research area: the politics of judicial review.
Like many other legal academics, I became frustrated
fairly early on in my career with a purely doctrinal
approach. I wanted not just to participate in the con-
struction of constitutional law doctrine from an internal,
legal-professional perspective but also to place the work
of the court whose jurisprudence I was studying – the
South African Constitutional Court – into a broader,
comparative perspective. That interest led me to begin
reading political science accounts of judicial decision-
making in the United States. I found those accounts fas-
cinating because they were so dismissive of the perspec-
tive that I had taken for granted: that law is capable of
constraining judicial decision-making in a way that sets
it apart from politics. After 15 years of research in this
area, I think I may have found a way of integrating my
specifically South African understanding of the con-
straining influence of law with an American political sci-
ence understanding of constitutional courts as deeply
implicated in politics. Not just that, but I think that the
interdisciplinary conceptual framework I have devel-
oped is capable of delivering insights that each of these
disciplines on its own is not. I should be happy with
that, but I am plagued by a concern that I have lost both
my potential audiences along the way – that my work is
now not doctrinal enough to be of much interest to
South African (or even comparative) constitutional law-
yers and insufficiently sophisticated from a methodolog-
ical point of view to be of much interest to political sci-
entists.
2 Defining Law as a Discipline
As Sanne Taekema has argued: ‘Interdisciplinarity does
not make sense without the idea of disciplinarity. To say
anything sensible about interdisciplinary research into
law, it is therefore necessary to have an idea of what the
discipline of law is’.2 This is clearly correct. The nature
of law as an academic discipline, however, is contested,
and the severity of the incorporation problem differs
accordingly.
In the editors’ introduction to this special issue,
Kathleen Sullivan’s 2002 Michigan Law Review fore-
word is cited in support of the proposition that ‘legal
doctrinal research cannot be other than interdisciplinary
by nature’.3 It is not clear, however, that this is what
Sullivan was arguing. Her actual claim is that ‘the disci-
pline of law is itself multidisciplinary, built upon if not
reducible into elements of the humanities and social sci-
ences’.4 That claim seems to be addressing legal
research as a whole rather than doctrinal research in
particular. Be that as it may, the idea that any discipline
may be inherently interdisciplinary is controversial.5 To
be sure, many new disciplines do arise from the combi-
nation of two or more disciplines – like biochemistry,
for example, which has its origins in the separate disci-
plines of biology and chemistry. But it is a defining
quality of a discipline that it must possess its own dis-
tinctive conceptual frameworks and methodologies.6
However much it draws on existing disciplines, if a form
of academic research is to be recognised as a discipline
in its own right, it must transcend the disciplines on
which it is drawing to create some larger whole. Disci-
plines on this view of things may have interdisciplinary
origins, but it is conceptually impossible for there to be
such a thing as an interdisciplinary discipline.
This position may come across as a little dogmatic. Def-
initions of the term ‘discipline’ are largely a matter of
taste, and some scholars might prefer to define disci-
plines so as to leave space for the notion of an interdisci-
plinary discipline. I thus have no desire to defend the
above conception as the ‘correct’ one. There madness
(and great deal of fatuousness, too) lies. In relation to
the editors’ specific claim that ‘legal doctrinal research
cannot be other than interdisciplinary by nature’, how-
2. S. Taekema, ‘Relative Autonomy: A Characterization of the Discipline of
Law’, in B. van Klink and S. Taekeman (eds.), Law and Method (2011)
33.
3. See Editors’ introduction to this special issue.
4. K.M. Sullivan, ‘Foreword: Interdisciplinarity’, 100 Michigan Law Review
1217, at 1218-1219 (2002).
5. I can understand (although I do not completely agree with) the claim
that socio-legal research is inherently interdisciplinary, for there one is
talking about a field to which a number of researchers are contributing,
either from within their different disciplines (making the field strictly
speaking multidisciplinary) or by combining two or more of those disci-
plines (interdisciplinary research proper). But to say that a single disci-
pline is inherently interdisciplinary challenges conventional notions of
what a discipline is.
6. S. Taekema and B. van Klink, ‘On the Border: Limits and Possibilities of
Interdisciplinary Research’, in B. van Klink and S. Taekema (eds.), Law
and Method (2011) 7.
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ever, I do have a bit of an axe to grind – or three to be
precise. Firstly, I think that this claim gets the essence
of doctrinal research wrong. At the very least, the alter-
native possibility – that doctrinal research, in drawing
on other disciplines, simply absorbs them into its own
logic – needs to be properly considered. Secondly, the
proposition that doctrinal research is inherently interdis-
ciplinary needs to be carefully distinguished from the
proposition that legal research is today characteristically
interdisciplinary. That alternative proposition seems to
me more defensible – not because legal research is an
exception to the rule that disciplines may not be inher-
ently interdisciplinary but because legal research is not a
discipline, but rather a convenient, catch-all term for
the research that legal academics do. Thirdly, the claim
that doctrinal research is inherently interdisciplinary
makes it hard to understand the particular kind of inter-
disciplinary research that legal academics do, which
combines doctrinal research with research that draws on
the conceptual frameworks and methods of other disci-
plines. If doctrinal research is inherently interdisciplina-
ry, what is the difference between that form of research
and socio-legal research? The rest of this section grinds
each of these axes in turn.
Consider first my worry about the editors’ claim that
‘legal doctrinal research cannot be other than interdisci-
plinary by nature’. The lead-in paragraph to this state-
ment reads:
First, there is no such thing as purely monodiscipli-
nary doctrinal analysis. To study and interpret legal
materials, researchers have to rely on history and lin-
guistics. To deal with apparent contradictions, they
need to apply logic, argumentation theory, and phi-
losophy. To understand the purpose of legal regula-
tions, they must understand the society in which law
is embedded, and the human behaviour it attempts to
regulate. This means that they need to incorporate
behavioural disciplines such as economics, sociology,
and psychology. Finally, as Dworkin has convincing-
ly argued, in order to construct legal doctrine in its
best light, legal analysis must incorporate moral and
political philosophy.
My difficulty with this argument is that it uses the fact
that doctrinal researchers ‘rely’ on, ‘apply’, ‘under-
stand’, and ‘incorporate’ knowledge from other disci-
plines as conclusive support for the proposition that
doctrinal analysis cannot be ‘purely mono-disciplinary’.
As indicated, that way of proceeding ignores the alterna-
tive understanding that, in drawing on other disciplines,
doctrinal researchers are not conducting interdisciplina-
ry research, but simply deploying the accepted reason-
ing techniques of the legal tradition in which they are
working. On one famous view, after all, law’s character-
istic mode is to be ‘cognitively open’ to other social sys-
tems but ‘normatively closed’.7 In just the same way,
7. N. Luhmann, Law as a Social System trans. K.A. Ziegert, ed. F. Kastner,
R. Nobles, D. Schiff & R. Ziegert (2004).
doctrinal research may draw on knowledge produced by
other disciplines, and even mimic their methods, with-
out necessarily becoming interdisciplinary. If a doctrinal
researcher makes a philosophical point about the mean-
ing of a legal concept, for example, that is not necessari-
ly interdisciplinary research. Its status as such depends
on whether an argument like that can be made according
to conventionally accepted reasoning techniques in the
legal tradition concerned. If it can, such research is
‘purely mono-disciplinary’ in the sense that it remains
within the confines of acceptable doctrinal argument in
that legal tradition.
Underlying my difficulty with the editors’ approach, it
should by now be clear, is a particular understanding of
the nature of doctrinal research as an academic disci-
pline. As I have argued at greater length elsewhere,8 the
crucial defining feature of doctrinal research is that it is
offered as a participant act in a particular legal system.9
Unlike other academic disciplines, doctrinal researchers
are not primarily addressing a scholarly community, but
a legal-professional community engaged in a joint enter-
prise of constructing legal doctrine. Their function in
that community is not the same, to be sure, as legisla-
tures and judges. They are systematisers and refiners,
not primary producers. That entails certain differences
of perspective. Legal academics, for example, have
greater freedom to explore the connections between
cases and the impact of new statutory frameworks on
the legal system as a whole. They also have a role as
change agents in the legal system, using their greater
distance from practice and the time they have for reflec-
tion to make suggestions about how the law might be
improved. Even when criticising the way a particular
case has been decided or a statute’s attempts to reform
the law, however, doctrinal researchers need to present
their arguments in a form that legal practitioners find
intelligible and consonant with accepted reasoning tech-
niques. This understanding of doctrinal research as a
participant act in a particular legal system means that
the methodological standards for doctrinal research are
set by the legal tradition in which the researcher is
working.Unlike other academic disciplines, doctrinal
research has no transnational standards or claim to uni-
versal applicability. Rather, what constitutes sound
research is determined by highly localised standards
peculiar to the legal tradition, and even the particular
area of law,10,11 in which the researcher is working. Pro-
vided the doctrinal researcher respects those standards,
the fact that his or her research may not be convincing
8. Theunis Roux, ‘Judging the Quality of Legal Research: A Qualified
Response to the Demand for Greater Methodological Rigour’ (2014) 24
Legal Education Review 173.
9. See C. McCrudden, ‘Legal Research and the Social Sciences’ (2006) 122
Law Quarterly Review 632, 633 (‘traditional legal analysis adopts an
“internal” approach’, which involves ‘the analysis of legal rules and
principles taking the perspective of an insider in the system’).
10. For a similar view, see D. Nelken, ‘Why Must Legal Ideas Be Interpreted
Sociologically? Roger Cotterrell and the Vocation of Sociology of Law’,
in R. Nobles and D. Schiff (eds.), Law, Society and Community (2014)
23, at 28.
11. See Roux, above n. 8.
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to a researcher from another discipline is irrelevant. At
least, the answer to any such criticism is the same
answer that an economist would give to criticism from
an historian, or a political theorist to criticism from an
empirical social scientist: that is not the way we do
things here.
It follows further that, if the legal tradition in which the
doctrinal researcher is working supports a particular
way of using knowledge from another discipline, it is
open to the doctrinal researcher to adopt that method,
however incompetent this may seem to scholars within
that other discipline. Equally, if a doctrinal researcher
can show that the way the legal tradition in which he or
she is working uses knowledge from other disciplines is
deficient, measured by that tradition’s standards, this
should be pointed out. But that would again be with a
view to participating in the construction of legal doc-
trine in a particular legal system. Doctrinal researchers’
primary fidelity, in other words, is to the standards,
including the internal values and purposes, of the legal
tradition in which they are working, not to the meth-
odological standards of the disciplines on which they
may from time to time draw.
Of course, the internal values and purposes of a legal
tradition usually include a commitment to improving
the way justice is administered (or ‘making the law bet-
ter’, as it is sometimes put). To that extent, it is open to
the doctrinal researcher to argue that the values and
purposes of his or her legal tradition would be better
served if knowledge from another discipline were used
more rigorously.12 Even in this case, however, such an
argument would not entail a holus bolus subordination
of the standards of the legal tradition in which the doc-
trinal researcher was working to the standards of the
other discipline. Only so much of the other discipline’s
standards as were necessary to promote the particular
legal tradition’s values and purposes would need to be
respected. The aim of this type of doctrinal research, in
other words, would not be interdisciplinary synthesis or
even dialogue, but one-way borrowing with a view to
the improvement of legal doctrine.
This understanding of doctrinal research entails certain
consequences for law as an academic discipline (my sec-
ond axe). Most importantly, the diversification of legal
research over the last 40 years should not be understood
as an expansion of the discipline of doctrinal research,
but as an expansion of legal research – the sum total of
research activities in which legal academics are engaged.
But legal research in this expanded form is not an aca-
12. I leave aside here the question whether the internal values of a legal
tradition are ‘normatively insulated from other values’ (as it was put to
me by one of the anonymous reviewers of this piece). Of course, as a
sociological matter, the internal norms of a legal tradition are exposed
to influence by broader societal values. The point here is simply that,
when it comes to assessing the soundness of a doctrinal argument, it is
the internal values of the legal tradition that matter; however, much
they may have been influenced in the course of their development by
broader societal values. My position, in other words, is not that law is
completely autonomous from other social systems but that the stan-
dards for assessing the quality of doctrinal research are internal legal
standards.
demic discipline according to either of the main criteria:
it has no governing conceptual framework and no domi-
nant methodology. Rather, it is a collection of disci-
plines and interdisciplines: doctrinal research as the core
discipline, legal academics’ version of socio-legal
research (which combines doctrinal research with at
least one other discipline), sociology of law (the mono-
disciplinary study of law from a sociological perspec-
tive), legal history, comparative legal research, legal phi-
losophy (which is today typically treated as a sub-disci-
pline of philosophy), and a variety of critical approaches
(which are often concerned with doctrine, but for pur-
poses of deconstructing rather than constructing it). In
addition to this, there are the various forms of ‘law and
__’ research in which legal academics and other scholars
are engaged, much of which is mono-disciplinary
research that just happens to be about law and legal
institutions.13
There is no unifying conceptual framework for all these
approaches and no dominant methodology that they all
employ. It is thus wrong to think of legal research in the
broad as a discipline. This is what Sullivan meant, I
think, when she wrote that ‘the discipline of law is itself
multidisciplinary, built upon if not reducible into ele-
ments of the humanities and social sciences’.14 Subject
to my point about disciplines not being inherently inter-
disciplinary, this is an accurate description of what legal
research has today become: a multidisciplinary field that
is unified only by the fact that the research being con-
ducted within it has something to do with law and legal
institutions.
Within that broad multidisciplinary field, as several
studies have shown,15 the most prominent form of
research being conducted by legal academics in the
Anglo-American world is socio-legal research. The ter-
minology is somewhat confusing because socio-legal
research is itself a multidisciplinary field that includes
contributions from scholars in sociology, anthropology,
political science, and so on.16 How can the typical
research that legal academics do belong to a field to
which they are only one of many contributors? The
answer is that legal academics mostly engage in one very
particular kind of socio-legal research: interdisciplinary
research that combines doctrinal understandings with
insights from other disciplines. Their specialisation
within the broader field of socio-legal research, and the
reason why they are able to do this type of research from
within the legal academy, comes from the fact that they
use their legal-professional training to research the
interrelationship between law and society. Whereas a
pure sociologist of law might be interested, say, in the
way attitudes to law affect bureaucratic decision-mak-
ing, a legal academic might be interested in whether a
13. See further Roux, above n. 8.
14. Sullivan, above n. 4, at 1218-1219.
15. See F. Cownie, Legal Academics: Culture and Identities (2004).
16. L.M. Friedman, ‘The Law and Society Movement’, 38 Stanford Law
Review 763, at 773 (1986); S. Scheingold, ‘A Home Away from Home:
Collaborative Research Networks and Interdisciplinary Socio-Legal
Scholarship’, 4 Annual Review of Law and Social Science 1 (2008).
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particular administrative law rule has actually had the
effect on bureaucratic decision-makers that the court
developing the rule anticipated.17
This point is the segue to my third and final axe: the
complaint that, if doctrinal research is understood as
being inherently interdisciplinary, it is not at all certain
what the difference is between doctrinal research and
the particular kind of socio-legal research that legal aca-
demics do. Perhaps this is what is meant by the state-
ment that ‘we’re all socio-legal now’.18 But there are still
legal academics (including some of my colleagues) who
would strenuously deny that their research is socio-
legal, and the basis for that denial has to do with the dif-
ference between doctrinal research as defined above and
the legal-academic variant of socio-legal research. For
the pure doctrinal researcher, reference to other disci-
plines always occurs on law’s terms,19 with a view to
improving the quality of legal doctrine. There is never
any thought of subordinating the conventionally accep-
ted reasoning techniques in the legal tradition in which
they are working to the methods of another discipline.
Even entering into a productive exchange between
another discipline and legal doctrine is not really what
their research is about. Rather, the insights and methods
of the other discipline are used only in so far as, and to
the extent that, they assist in shedding light on a partic-
ular doctrinal problem.20 The conception of the prob-
lem and the methods for resolving it are determined
from within the discipline of doctrinal research.
The flipside of this point is that the very idea of inter-
disciplinarity in legal research depends on there being
some distinctively legal discipline capable of entering
into dialogue with other disciplines. Douglas Vick
expresses this point well, I think, when he says that: ‘In
fact, without the strong and distinctive disciplinary basis
for legal inquiries provided by doctrinalism, there would
be no benchmark against which interdisciplinary experi-
mentation could define itself.’21 In the same vein, we
might ask, what was all the fuss about when the field of
socio-legal studies was launched? If doctrinal research is
inherently interdisciplinary, why did that development
initially meet with such resistance from doctrinalists,
and why did socio-legal scholars breathe such a collec-
tive sigh of relief when they finally broke free of the
17. For the court developing the rule, its precise sociological effects might
not have been important. Where the legal academic examines those
effects and goes beyond what was doctrinally required for purposes of
critiquing the rule, his or her research is properly described as socio-
legal.
18. R. Collier, ‘“We’re All Socio-Legal Now”: Legal Education, Scholarship
and the “Global Knowledge Economy” – Reflections on the UK Experi-
ence’, 26 Sydney Law Review 503 (2004).
19. For a similar idea, see J.M. Balkin, ‘Interdisciplinarity as Colonization’,
53 Washington & Lee Law Review 949, at 958 (1996) (giving an exam-
ple of ‘legal work’ that looks interdisciplinary, but is in ‘another sense’
not because ‘it does not stray very far from two familiar lawyerly tasks:
arguing over which rule better serves public policy and finding addition-
al citations to put in the footnotes of one’s brief’).
20. Cf. the idea of using other disciplines ‘heuristically’ in Taekema and van
Klink, above n. 6.
21. D.W. Vick, ‘Interdisciplinarity and the Discipline of Law’, 31 Journal of
Law & Society (2004) 163, at 166.
doctrinal shackles that bound them? The answer can
only be that the shackles were real and that they survive
to this day, although they now bind only those who
choose to be bound by them.
3 The Real Nature of the
Incorporation Problem in
Interdisciplinary Legal
Research
With this understanding of legal research in place, the
dimensions of the incorporation problem in interdisci-
plinary legal research become clearer. The real problem
is not what it is said to be in the editors’ introduction,
viz.: ‘How can we translate and incorporate the various
non-legal disciplines and their findings into the lan-
guage of legal doctrine?’ Rather, the problem is whether
it is possible to do genuinely interdisciplinary research
when one of the disciplines involved is doctrinal
research.
Why does the editors’ problem fall away? On the under-
standing of doctrinal research set out here, the incorpo-
ration of non-legal disciplines into doctrinal research
necessarily occurs on law’s terms. As practitioners of a
discipline that has always used knowledge and methods
from other disciplines as part of its argumentative
machinery, doctrinal researchers are expert cannibalis-
ers of material from other disciplines.22 From the point
of view of legal doctrine, there is nothing particularly
untoward about this. Legal doctrine’s primary interest is
not fidelity to the disciplines on which it draws, but
fidelity to law. So the only limit on the incorporation of
other disciplines from the point of view of legal doctrine
is the need to ensure that other disciplines are used in a
way that promotes the coherent and socially efficacious
development of the law. The methodological standards
that doctrinal researchers need to observe in this respect
are the methodological standards of the legal tradition in
which they are working.
I would place only two qualifications on this argument.
First, doctrinal researchers play a particular role within
the legal-professional community, which I have else-
where described as that of a ‘doctrinal clean-up team’.23
They are the systematisers and the ex post rationalisers,
making coherent and smoothing out what legislatures
and judges have done in the heat of parliamentary
debate or case-specific law making. As part of that gen-
eral clean-up role, doctrinal researchers have a height-
ened duty to point out instances where knowledge from
other disciplines has been misapplied in ways that have
produced sub-optimal results for the legal system.
Thus, a doctrinal researcher might argue that Judge So-
22. I prefer the term ‘cannibalising’ to ‘colonising’ to reflect the fact that
doctrinal research has no imperial ambitions. Cf. Balkin, above n. 19, at
964-67.
23. See Roux, above n. 8.
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and-So relied on this particular piece of research from
that discipline in support of such and such a conception
of a legal norm, but the research, properly understood,
does not actually support that understanding of the legal
norm. In arguing thus, however, the doctrinal research-
er is not primarily motivated by the desire to maintain
the standards of the incorporated discipline, but by the
desire to improve legal doctrine.
As to their own suggestions for reform, doctrinal
researchers’ status as academics within the university
makes them more susceptible than judges to criticism
that they have misunderstood the disciplines on which
they are drawing. Where the doctrinal researcher is try-
ing to make a contribution to those disciplines, such
criticism is warranted. But where the doctrinal research-
er is doing purely doctrinal research – focused only on
the improvement of legal doctrine – such criticism may
be misplaced. At least, the mere fact that concepts or
methods from another discipline have been used in a
way that researchers from that discipline think lacks rig-
our is not conclusive. The standard for incorporation is
an internal legal standard, and doctrinal researchers are
best placed to judge whether that standard has been
met.
The second qualification on the argument that the
incorporation of non-legal disciplines into doctrinal
research necessarily occurs on law’s terms is that doctri-
nal research, as a discipline, has an interest in continual-
ly improving its use of other disciplines. A particular
legal tradition’s internal standards for drawing on other
disciplines are not static. Whereas, in 1950, say, a judge
in Australia might have gotten away with an armchair-
observer argument about the likely social effects of a
legal rule, today he or she might be expected to support
such an argument by reference to empirical research.
This sort of phenomenon is a reflection of the evolution
of legal traditions and their tendency to require ever
more sophisticated reasoning techniques over time. But
there is nothing in this process that means that doctrinal
research is necessarily subject to the full panoply of
methodological standards applied in other disciplines.24
The evolution occurs at the legal tradition’s own pace,
on its own terms, and doctrinal researchers are beholden
to those internal, evolving standards, not to the stan-
dards of other disciplines.
As noted, doctrinal researchers’ particular function
within the legal system means that they may play a van-
guard role in this evolutionary process. As rationalisers
and systematisers, they need continually to point out to
judges and legislators how they might make better use
of knowledge from other disciplines. They need in this
sense to push the boundaries of their discipline by chal-
lenging all participants to become more sophisticated.
As educators, doctrinal researchers also have a role to
play in training their students to make better use of
knowledge and methods from other disciplines. Such
24. My position in this respect thus differs from that set out in K. Burns and
T. Hutchinson, ‘The Impact of “Empirical Facts” on Legal Scholarship
and Legal Research Training’, 43 The Law Teacher 153 (2009).
interventions not only assist in making the students
more effective practising lawyers but also enable doctri-
nal researchers to play the role of change agents in the
legal profession. A successful piece of doctrinal
research, on this view, is one that expands lawyers’ hori-
zons by showing how knowledge from other disciplines
may be incorporated in a way that promotes the fairness
or social effectiveness of law.
Subject to these two qualifications, the answer to the
question of how other disciplines and their findings may
be translated and incorporated into doctrinal research is
that this must be done in the way doctrinal researchers
have always done it: by following the methodological
standards set by the legal-professional community of
which they are a part. Since doctrinal researchers by
definition have no interest in contributing to the disci-
plines on which they are drawing, they need not observe
all of their methods to the nth degree. When faced by
the criticism, as they increasingly are, that their research
does not meet the standards set by other disciplines,
they may legitimately respond: we are practitioners of a
separate discipline, with its own standards.25 What doc-
trinal researchers need to get better at, of course, is
explaining those standards to researchers from other
disciplines. But that is a different question.
As noted, the real incorporation problem in interdisci-
plinary legal research is whether it is possible to do gen-
uinely interdisciplinary research when one of the disci-
plines involved is doctrinal research. The essence of the
problem here is that researchers who engage in the typi-
cal kind of interdisciplinary research in which legal aca-
demics are engaged – socio-legal research – are pulled in
two seemingly incompatible directions. On the one
hand, they need to satisfy the standards of the legal tra-
dition in which they are working – to be faithful enough
to conventionally accepted methods of legal reasoning
that their doctrinal arguments carry sufficient weight to
be accepted. On the other hand, they need to satisfy the
standards of the scholarly literature to which they are
contributing, a literature whose standards are in the
nature of things policed by scholars from other disci-
plines. Straddling this divide is very difficult, if not
impossible, for two main reasons.
The first reason is illustrated by Judge Harry Edwards’s
famous attack on the irrelevance of much contemporary
legal-academic research.26 For many judges and legal
professionals, Judge Edwards argued, legal academics’
increasing interest since the 1970s in other disciplines
has taken them further and further away from their pri-
mary social function: to act as a sounding board and
source of support for the legal profession. As much as
legal academics may welcome the fact that their research
is becoming more sophisticated in a scholarly sense,
many legal professionals today think that their research
is out of touch with the practical problems facing legal
decision-makers. While it may be very interesting to
25. See Roux, above n. 8.
26. H.T. Edwards, ‘The Growing Disjunction between Legal Education and
the Legal Profession’, 91 Michigan Law Review 34 (1992).
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know, for example, whether judges are influenced by
their class position when deciding property rights dis-
putes, this may be less interesting to judges than wheth-
er s 55(1)(f) of the Invented for Purposes of this Exam-
ple Land Act really means that they have no discretion
to issue an eviction order.
Legal academics may, of course, defend themselves
against this kind of charge by confronting it head on.
They can attempt to show why the problem they have
identified really is a problem for the legal system, even
though those involved in the practical workings of that
system have not taken notice of it yet. That is part of
legal academics’ vanguard function, as noted earlier. But
there is a point at which the pursuit of scholarly knowl-
edge for its own sake comes into tension with the practi-
cal requirements of the legal profession. Just as much as
we might want to say that the legal profession should
not exclusively determine what questions legal academ-
ics research, so we might want to say that practising
lawyers are under no obligation to find everything that
legal academics do interesting. Practising lawyers tend
to lead busier, more stressful lives than legal academics,
and thus they are entitled to expect legal academics to
write in a more focused, economical way if they want to
make an impact. The more they respond to that legiti-
mate expectation, however, the less credibility legal aca-
demics’ work tends to have in the scholarly community.27
That is the practical dimension of the problem. The sec-
ond reason why straddling the divide between legal doc-
trine and an external body of social scientific or humani-
ties knowledge is difficult is a more philosophical one. It
concerns the question whether it is possible to be simul-
taneously inside the law for purposes of contributing to
legal doctrine and outside the law for purposes of con-
tributing to another academic discipline.28 On the
understanding of legal doctrine propounded here, doc-
trinal research is a participant act in a particular legal
tradition, in which the legal researcher accepts the con-
straints imposed by an attitude of fidelity to law in that
tradition. Importantly, this internal perspective is not
just an interpretive perspective in the ordinary social sci-
ence sense29 but also a participatory perspective in as
much as the doctrinal researcher intends to contribute
to the practice of law in the legal tradition concerned.30
How may this perspective be integrated with non-inter-
pretive or interpretive but non-participatory perspec-
tives? ‘Can you simultaneously operate within a prac-
27. This tension is experienced in Australia in the lower status accorded to
‘practitioner journals’. Under the new Research Performance Measure
about to be introduced at UNSW Australia, for example, legal academ-
ics who write for those journals will receive fewer points than those
who publish in highly regarded international journals.
28. See B.Z. Tamanaha, ‘The Internal/External Distinction and the Notion of
a “Practice” in Legal Theory and Sociolegal Studies’, 30 Law & Society
Review 163 (1996).
29. M.S. Moore, ‘The Interpretive Turn in Modern Theory: A Turn for the
Worse?’, 41 Stanford Law Review 871 (1989).
30. See R.M. Dworkin, Law’s Empire (1986) 14.
tice’, as Stanley Fish puts the point, ‘and be self-con-
sciously in touch with the conditions that enable it?’31
Fish’s question suggests that the incorporation problem
in interdisciplinary legal research may be no different to
the incorporation problem in all interdisciplinary
research: one of the disciplines involved is always going
to come out on top and that is typically going to be the
discipline in which the researcher was first trained. This
is what one might call the ‘spectacles’ view of the prob-
lem, where training in a particular discipline is under-
stood as a form of socialisation that is very hard to
shake. Even if researchers take two undergraduate
degrees, say, or do specialised postgraduate courses in
the methods of another discipline, the discipline that
gets to their untrained mind first is going to be the dis-
cipline through which they see the world, and through
which they ineluctably translate the insights of the sec-
ond discipline, even as they attempt to conduct their
research in a scrupulously even-handed way.
If there is a special dimension to this problem in the case
of interdisciplinary legal research, it is that the two com-
munities between which the legal researcher is trying to
move are very different: the one a mixed legal-professio-
nal/academic community and the other a pure academic
community. This may entail certain added difficulties.
The knowledge system to which legal researchers are
contributing, for one, is not the privately produced, cor-
rigible work product of a purely academic discipline,
but the state-sanctioned legal system, with its corpus of
authoritative norms and its conventionally accepted
ways of working with those norms. The practical
dimension to this, as we have seen, is the problem of
moving between two very different audiences, each with
its own expectations and standards. The philosophical
dimension is that the two audiences are engaged in very
different sorts of practices: one that is about the con-
struction of legal doctrine and another that is about the
accumulation of scholarly knowledge.
Rather than trying to contribute to the philosophy of
interdisciplinarity (for which I am not equipped), the
rest of this paper tries to illustrate the practical and phil-
osophical sides of the incorporation problem as I have
experienced them in my own research. Given my insist-
ence on respecting the disciplinary boundaries of doctri-
nal research, it may come as a surprise to learn that my
own research is interdisciplinary. As I hope to show,
however, successful interdisciplinarity is not about
ignoring or transgressing disciplinary boundaries, but
about researching across two or more disciplines while
remaining true to their methods and purposes.
31. S. Fish, There’s No Such Thing as Free Speech (and It’s A Good Thing
Too) (1994).
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4 Illustration from My Own
Research
My main research interest for the last 15 years or so has
been the politics of judicial review. Typically, this
research interest has been thought to be a research spe-
cialisation in comparative politics, which is itself a spe-
cialisation in political science. Having had no formal
training in political science, however, I necessarily had
to come at the politics of judicial review from an inter-
disciplinary perspective. In particular, my research is
being conducted at the interface of comparative consti-
tutional law (a rapidly growing international research
field in which legal academics from a number of differ-
ent countries have been participating32) and comparative
judicial politics (the specialisation within comparative
politics that looks at the role of constitutional courts in
national political systems33).
Constitutional lawyers and political scientists have, of
course, long been engaged in an interdisciplinary dia-
logue, particularly in the United States, where the study
of judicial politics grew out of the American legal realist
call for a science of judicial decision-making.34 Despite
that starting point, political scientists initially went their
own way, their methods heavily influenced by the
behaviourist movement in the social sciences.35 Behav-
iourists took an entirely external perspective on judicial
decision-making, using quantitative methods to discern
causal relationships between, say, the party of the
appointing President and the outcome of judicial deci-
sions in ideological terms. This approach modelled law
in a way that was so radically alien to the legal-academic
perspective that academic lawyers mostly ignored it. It
was only from the mid-1980s or so that legal academics
started to pay more attention to political science
accounts of judicial decision making. This was facilitat-
ed, first, by the proliferation of rational choice scholar-
ship, which permeated both the legal academy and
political science departments, and then by the rise of
historical institutionalism in political science, which
conceives of law in a way that most legal academics rec-
ognise – as a relatively autonomous social system with
its own internal values, traditions, and thought process-
es.36 Within political science, the historical institutional-
ist perspective has influenced judicial behaviourists,
who have begun to model law in more sophisticated
32. The field has its own specialist journal (the International Journal of
Constitutional Law) and scientific body (the International Association
of Constitutional Law).
33. For a useful introduction, see Part III of K.E. Whittington, R.D. Kelemen
& G.A. Caldeira (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Law and Politics
(2010).
34. See B.Z. Tamanaha, Beyond the Formalist-Realist Divide: The Role of
Politics in Judging (2009).
35. Ibid., at 112-15.
36. See C.W. Clayton and H. Gillman (eds.), Supreme Court Decision-Mak-
ing: New Institutionalist Approaches (1999).
ways.37 At the same time, legal academics have started
to do their own quantitative research on judging.38 All
of this has brought political scientists and academic law-
yers in the United States much closer together than they
have been for some time.39
Beneath the apparently calm surface, however, there is
still quite a lot of tension between the two sets of schol-
ars. Lee Epstein and Gary King’s brutal attack on the
empirical methods used in American law reviews is the
most famous instance of this,40 but there have been oth-
er interventions as well.41 In my own particular area of
specialisation, Ran Hirschl has been particularly hard-
hitting in his criticisms of comparative constitutional
lawyers, dismissing much of their work as being of little
scholarly value.42 As with Epstein and King’s more gen-
eral critique, Hirschl’s comments focus on legal academ-
ics’ alleged lack of comprehension of the ‘rules of infer-
ence’ – of how to move from empirical observations
about particular cases to more generalised propositions
of social science. Even allowing for the fact that not all
social scientists would necessarily see things the same
way, these criticisms have been bracing, to say the least.
There is also reason to think, however, that political sci-
entists do not always properly understand what is at
stake for legal academics when they undertake cross-
country comparisons. The fact that a particular legal
tradition, for example, may authorise reference to for-
eign law in a particular way, is a point often missed.
In my own research, I have tried to integrate my under-
standing of constitutional law doctrine in the two juris-
dictions in which I have worked with the conceptual
frameworks and methods of comparative judicial poli-
tics. My first proper attempt at doing so was published
in my 2013 book on the South African Constitutional
Court (CCSA).43 Chapter 1 of that book sets out what I
argued was a necessarily interdisciplinary research ques-
tion: how it came about that the CCSA, in the first 10
years of its existence, had been successful in two very
different senses – a political science sense, which had to
do with its effectiveness as a veto player in South Afri-
can politics, and a legal-doctrinal sense, which had to
do with its internationally admired, principled in-
terpretation of the 1993 and 1996 South African Consti-
37. See B.L. Bartels, ‘The Constraining Capacity of Legal Doctrine on the
U.S. Supreme Court’, 103 American Political Science Review 474
(2009); M.A. Bailey and F. Maltzman, The Constrained Court: Law,
Politics, and the Decisions Justices Make (2011).
38. See, for example, C.R. Sunstein, D. Schkade, L.M. Ellman & A. Sawicki,
Are Judges Political? An Empirical Analysis of the Federal Judiciary
(2006).
39. There are chairs in Law and Political Science at Yale, Duke, and Chica-
go, for example.
40. L. Epstein and G. King, ‘The Rules of Inference’, 69 University of Chica-
go Law Review 1 (2002).
41. See also G.N. Rosenberg, ‘Across the Great Divide (Between Law and
Political Science)’, 3 2d Green Bag 267 (2000).
42. See R. Hirschl, ‘On the Blurred Methodological Matrix of Comparative
Constitutional Law’, in S. Choudhry (ed.), The Migration of Constitu-
tional Ideas (2007) 39 and R. Hirschl, ‘Editorial’, 11 International Jour-
nal of Constitutional Law 1 (2013).
43. Theunis Roux, The Politics of Principle - The First South African Consti-
tutional Court, 1995-2005 (2013).
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tutions.44 While definitive of mature constitutional
courts, I argued, simultaneous success on these two
fronts is something that is very rarely achieved by a con-
stitutional court in a new democracy and something
which neither a purely doctrinal understanding of the
Court’s decisions nor comparative judicial politics on its
own could properly explain. In Chapter 2 of the book, I
accordingly proceeded to develop an interdisciplinary
conceptual framework for addressing my research ques-
tion. The main argument of that chapter was that some
mediating concept was required to bring the two disci-
plines on which I was relying into dialogue with each
other. In particular, I suggested that the idea of ‘con-
straint’, which features in both disciplines albeit in dif-
ferent guises, could be used as a basis for examining how
constitutional courts negotiate the competing demands
of law and politics.
The rest of the book applied that framework to analyse
the CCSA’s decision-making record, in the process
blending doctrinal analysis with insights from the com-
parative judicial politics literature. For example, in
Chapter 9, I tried to show how the CCSA’s case law
enforcing political rights was perhaps the most disap-
pointing aspect of its record in purely doctrinal terms
and that this could be explained by the difficulty the
judges experienced in adapting their decisions in that
area of law to the cooperative working relationship they
were trying to forge with the ruling African National
Congress. To make this kind of argument, I coined vari-
ous terms to emphasise the interdisciplinary approach I
was using, including ‘adjudicative strategy’ (to capture
the way in which a court in a developed legal tradition
like the South African must establish its independence
in and through the constraints imposed by law), ‘micro-
politics’ (to capture the local political circumstances sur-
rounding a case that might give the court greater free-
dom to mediate the competing demands of law and poli-
tics), and ‘legal-cultural lag-effect’ (to capture the way
in which the received legal tradition exerts an inertial
effect on changes in reasoning style apparently required
by a new, rights-based Constitution).
I do not as yet know whether my book has succeeded in
laying the basis for a new interdisciplinary conversation.
Two reviews have thus far been published, but neither
really focuses on the interdisciplinary aspects of my
work. I do know for certain, however, that my book did
not impress at least one judge on the CCSA who wrote
to me to complain about the absence of a table of cases. I
had in fact included such a table in the draft manuscript
submitted to the publisher, but then took it out, partly
because the cases were already referenced in the index,
but partly also to signal that my book was not a tradi-
tional doctrinal commentary on the work of the CCSA
that could be used in legal argument and judgment writ-
ing. That signalling attempt obviously failed, suggesting
that there is still work to do, in South Africa at least, in
convincing practising lawyers that a book about judicial
decision-making might have a broader scholarly purpose
44. Ibid., at 15-71.
than simply assisting the legal profession to do its job
better.
Perhaps I should also take this incident as an indication
that, of the two audiences I was trying to address in the
book – the South African legal-professional community
and the international comparative constitutional law/
judicial politics community – I might have ended up
catering more to the second. Certainly, no advocate
arguing a case before the CCSA or judge writing an
opinion for the Court will find anything particularly
helpful in my book of a purely doctrinal nature. It is not
written for that purpose. Rather, I was trying to inject
into the local South African conversation a more realis-
tic appreciation of the political constraints under which
the CCSA was operating. To the extent that I dealt with
doctrine, my purpose was to show how the judges were
able to fashion review standards that supported a sus-
tainable institutional role for the Court. In presenting
the development of legal doctrine in this way, I argued
that the political context in which the Court was work-
ing influenced its decisions – that it deliberately chose
doctrines that enhanced its capacity to continue inde-
pendently enforcing the Constitution over the long run.
In so doing, I wanted to reappropriate for liberal legal-
ism a sense of law’s malleability in the service of politi-
cal ideals that has for too long been the preserve of criti-
cal legal theory. The proposition that judges’ sense of
their court’s institutional vulnerability might influence
their decisions is, however, anathema to South African
constitutional law’s conception of itself as separate from
politics. As soon as I made that argument, therefore, I
was no longer participating in the construction of legal
doctrine but viewing legal doctrine from the external
perspective of political science. I had my cake, but I
could not eat it.
5 Conclusion
What does my experience have to teach about the diffi-
culties of doing interdisciplinary legal research? The
first lesson, I think, is that, however hard one tries to
straddle the divide between doctrinal research and
another discipline, one does ultimately need to pick an
audience. As much as one’s skills as a trained lawyer
help one to understand the internal demands of the law,
there comes a point when what one is researching ceases
to be of much interest to legal practitioners and has
broader scholarly significance only. In this respect, aca-
demic lawyers are in a peculiar situation. Their compet-
itive advantage is that they know better than the average
social scientist what the internal demands of the law are
on the judges deciding the cases they are examining.
Their competitive disadvantage, however, is that they
tend not to be terribly well versed in the methodologies
required to support a sophisticated social science
research project.
The philosophical concern mentioned earlier is also
borne out, albeit in a somewhat unexpected way. On the
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one hand, my experience suggests that Stanley Fish was
right to argue that it is virtually impossible to participate
in two disciplinary practices at the same time; one prac-
tice is invariably going to dominate the other. On the
other hand, in my case at least, it has not been my pri-
mary training as a lawyer that has come to dominate but
my aspirations to contribute to the political science liter-
ature on judicial decision-making. There may be idio-
syncratic reasons for this. The fact that I migrated from
South Africa to Australia in 2009 means that since then
I have been working outside my primary legal-profes-
sional environment. Like others who have left their
home jurisdictions,45 this has given me an acute sense of
the differences between countries in legal-cultural
terms, which is how law now mainly figures as an
explanatory variable in my work. Had I not left South
Africa that might have not been the case, and thus
Fish’s argument may still be valid as a general rule.
Still, I think my experience is generalisable to the extent
that it suggests that interdisciplinary research is hard to
do, at least in a sustained way. The problem is not, as I
have been stressing, that it is difficult to incorporate
knowledge from other disciplines into doctrinal
research. Doctrinal researchers do that all of the time,
using the methods that have developed in their legal tra-
dition for doing this. Rather, the problem is that it is
very difficult to sustain a long-term research project that
is genuinely interdisciplinary in the sense that it: (i) is
driven by a research question that no single discipline
on its own can adequately answer and (ii) combines doc-
trinal research with at least one other discipline in a
more or less even-handed way. A true synthesis or com-
plete integration of disciplines, of course, might be the
ultimate goal. In my case, that would mean the integra-
tion of comparative judicial politics and comparative
constitutional law in a way that took both politics and
law seriously as separate forms of constraint on judicial
decision-making. Even, then, however, the question
would be whether the research being conducted was still
interdisciplinary or whether it was contributing to the
formation of a new discipline.
45. David Nelken’s research, for example, took a distinct legal-cultural turn
after his move to Italy. See, for example, D. Nelken, ‘Using the Concept
of Legal Culture’, 29 Australian Journal of Legal Philosophy 1 (2004).
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